The corruptible inspector
Roberto Burguet identifies optimal rules for a procurer when he incorporates the possibility that a supplier can bribe the inspector to misrepresent quality.
Roberto Burguet identifies optimal rules for a procurer when he incorporates the possibility that a supplier can bribe the inspector to misrepresent quality.
Does judiciary presence affect a politician’s management or possible graft of public resources? Stephan Litschig and Yves Zamboni estimate the effect of judges and prosecutors on the management of public resources in Brazil.
How much should people be taxed and what should tax revenues be spent on? Surprisingly, these topics have mostly been treated in isolation in academic research. Joan Esteban and Laura Mayoral present a model that determines the consensus income tax schedule, the composition of public expenditure, and the size of government.
If I call your Vodafone mobile from my Orange mobile, who should pay the cost of termination incurred by Vodafone? You, me, Orange or Vodafone? For that matter, which has the better business model – Europe with a “caller pays” system, or the US with an “everyone pays” system? Sjaak Hurkens and Angel L. López analyze an oligopoly of telecom networks to show how termination charges play a role in off-network usage and whether efficiency and profitability are achieved with current business models.